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 As many jurists and scholars have noted, the United States has a long-standing 
history of encroaching upon the civil liberties of its citizens, especially during times of 
war or conflict.
2
 For instance, during the Civil War, President Lincoln unilaterally 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus in response to increased violence and the threat of 
Southern succession.
3
 During World War I, Postmaster General Albert Burleson used the 
Espionage Act to suspend mailing privileges for certain “non-mailable” materials, such as 
newspapers and other dissident publications critical of the war effort.
4
 
The United States’ most egregious twentieth-century civil liberties violation 
occurred during World War II: the Japanese Internments.  Executive Order 9066, signed 
by President Roosevelt on February 19, 1942, and confirmed by Congress shortly 
thereafter, authorized west coast military commanders to impose curfews upon, and 
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eventually exclude, persons of Japanese ancestry, whether citizen or alien.
5
 Even the 
United States Supreme Court found these actions constitutional.
6
 
Civil liberty curtailments were not just limited to these “traditional” restrictions. 
Technology was also subject to the federal government’s reoccurring civil liberties 
violations.  During the Civil War, President Lincoln “seize[d] the telegraph lines and 
establish[ed] censorship over all transmissions.”
7
  During World War I, President Wilson 
seized and censored the recently developed wireless establishments.
8
 Additionally, at the 
end of World War I, the newly formed Bureau of Investigations (later the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation) began to conduct wiretaps.
9
 As it did with the Japanese internment, 
curfew, and exclusion cases, the United States Supreme Court initially found these 
actions permissible.
10
 In fact, it was not until 1967 that the Court held that wiretapping 
was indeed a Fourth Amendment search, thus requiring a warrant.
11
  
To more thoroughly address this concern, Congress passed the Wiretap Act in 
1968.
12
 This act created a comprehensive system to control and “facilitate the use of 
wiretapping and bugging (subject to appropriate safeguards) in federal criminal 
investigations.”
13
 However, it was not long before new technologies emerged that 
permitted the Government to circumvent the Wiretap Act and continue to electronically 
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monitor individuals and groups.  For instance, computers enabled the automation of 
“watch lists” in programs such as the National Security Agency’s MINARET project,
14
 
while emerging video technology in the 1980s enabled the government to obtain even 
more intrusive and revealing information than ever before.
15
 
As might have been expected, both the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 
(“9/11”) and subsequent conflicts have prompted the Government to once again expand 
national security measures.  While some of these expansions are necessary, many 
commentators believe there has been an overreaction and a “targeting and scapegoating 
[of] civil liberties.”
16
 Others claim that 9/11 has “been used as a pretext to loosen 
constraints that law enforcement has been chafing under for years.”
17
 
With that said, the post-9/11 government seems to be following in the footsteps of 
its predecessors.  There are secret detention and immigration proceedings, 
18
 as well as 
indefinite detentions of both foreign nationals and United States citizens.
19
  Many of 
these detentions were brought without charges or judicial hearings.
20
  Additionally, the 
post-9/11 government is using sophisticated technology now more than ever to create a 
surveillance society.  As commentators have stated, “The explosion of computers, 
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cameras, sensors, wireless communications, GPS, biometrics, and other technologies . . . 
is feeding a surveillance monster that is growing silently in our midst.”
21
  
 One of the ways this post-9/11 government is utilizing technology is via the USA 
PATRIOT Act’s reoccurring absence of judicial review procedures.  By making slight 
changes to previously enacted statutes, the PATRIOT Act is able to open up the gates to 
stored electronic communications.  As one commentator noted, “[The act] liberalizes the 
legal environment in which federal cops will be gathering and processing the routine 
informational detritus of the digital age.”
22
 
Specifically noteworthy is the PATRIOT Act’s effect on Internet surveillance. 
Millions of Americans use the Internet not just to shop, “but to research topics of interest, 
debate political issues, seek support for personal problems, and many other purposes that 
can generate deeply private information about their thoughts, interests, lifestyles, habits, 
and activities . . . .”
23
  Due to certain provisions of the PATRIOT Act enabling the 
government to have “automatic access to information stored and generated by Internet 
service providers,” there is great cause for concern amongst all online citizens.
24
  By 
utilizing relaxed requirements for investigation as well as “national security letter 
statutes,” the Government is now able to access our Internet activities and records with 
little trouble, no judicial oversight, and complete secrecy. 
 There is hope, however.  The District Court for the Southern District of New 
York’s recent decision in Doe v. Ashcroft provides a strong and well reasoned precedent 
for putting a boundary on the Government’s ability to access our online lives. In addition, 
                                                 
21
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23
 Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 60. 
24
 Parenti, supra note 22, at 118. 
   
 5 
this case joins the ranks of many other notable decisions that have established a decades-
old trend of requiring judicial review of technologically oriented curtailments of civil 
liberties, thereby ensuring a balance between privacy rights and national security 
interests. 
 The purpose of this note is to examine the USA PATRIOT Act’s subtle effect on 
the government’s ability to issue national security letters via 18 U.S.C. § 2709, and how 
one court, joining a long-standing judicial trend, declared that the Federal Government 
had gone too far by not providing any provisions for judicial oversight and review.  Part 
II provides an introduction to the USA PATRIOT Act.  Part III discusses the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and details the ever-expanding scope of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2709, including changes made by the USA PATRIOT Act.  Part IV contains an analysis 
of the Southern District of New York’s recent Doe v. Ashcroft decision.  Part V discusses 
the judiciary’s decades-long trend of requiring judicial review of technologically oriented 
curtailments of civil liberties and how Doe v. Ashcroft falls right into line with, and 
strongly supports, that trend. Part VI summarizes and concludes the matters discussed 
herein. 
 
II. An Introduction to the USA PATRIOT Act: 
 Congress passed the USA PATRIOT Act (“Patriot Act”) on October 26, 2001, 
just six weeks after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.
25
 Its stated purpose was “[t]o deter and 
punish terrorist acts in the United States and around the world, to enhance law 
                                                 
25
 Uniting and Strengthening America By Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001). 
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enforcement investigatory tools, and for other purposes.”
26
 The act found resounding 
support during its early days.  In fact, only one United States senator voted against it, and 
no major newspapers opposed it editorially.
27
 Some of this praise is justified since certain 
provisions “correct oversights in prior law or adapt technically worded statutes to new 
technologies and practices.”
28
  Examples include section 209, which gives judges 
authority to seize voice-mail messages pursuant to a warrant, and section 220, which 
allows nationwide service of search warrants for electronic evidence.  
However, less justifiable provisions have been created.  Particularly troublesome 
are the changes made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (“FISA”), 
codified as 50 U.S.C. § 1801 et. seq.
29
 This act establishes procedures for the 
“Government’s domestic electronic surveillance of foreign governments and their 
agents.”
30
 Traditionally, such surveillance is subject to less stringent standards, provided 
that it is “exclusively between or among foreign powers” and that “there is no substantial 
likelihood that the surveillance will acquire the contents of any communication to which 
a United States person is party.”
31
 However, under various Patriot Act provisions, the FBI 
can now, for example, obtain business and educational records without showing that the 
relevant customer or student is a foreign power or agent.
32
  
 The drafters of the Patriot Act must have also realized the ubiquitous use of the 
Internet because they created powerful provisions dealing with information stored by 
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constitutional concerns and protections implicated when investigations involve the activities of United 
States nationals.”). 
32
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communications firms.  These provisions essentially “undermine[] checks and balances 
by giving investigators new authority to track Internet usage . . . without having to 
demonstrate probable cause or obtain a judicial warrant.”
33
 By slightly altering national 
security letter statutes, like 18 U.S.C. § 2709, infra, the Patriot Act enables the FBI to 
“force anyone to turn over records on their customers or clients, giving the government 
unchecked power to rifle through individuals’ . . . Internet usage . . . .”
34
 These activities 
are conducted without showing suspicion of a crime, in complete secrecy, and without 
any judicial review.
35
 
 
III. The History of the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 and 
18 U.S.C. § 2709: 
 The 1968 Wiretap Act created a comprehensive system to control the 
Government’s use of wiretap surveillance.  Though the act was a major step forward in 
protecting citizens’ privacy, it was limited to the “aural interception of wire or oral 
communications . . . [and it] only applie[d] where the contents of a communication 
[could] be overheard and understood by the human ear.”
36
 New technologies emerged, 
however, and people were soon communicating via computer-to-computer transmissions, 
microwaves, satellite, video, paging systems, and faxes, all of which were, by definition, 
outside the bounds of the Wiretap Act.  In addition to these advances, the Government 
also had its own corresponding technological advances in surveillance.  Thus, it was not 
                                                 
33
 Id.  
34
 Stanley & Steinhardt, supra note 17, at 65. 
35
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36
 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3556; see also 18 U.S.C. § 
2510(4) (1968). 
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long before the Wiretap Act was declared “hopelessly out of date,” having “not kept pace 
with the development of communications and computer technology.”
37
 
The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (“ECPA”) was created to 
account for these advances in technology.
38
 The ECPA amended and updated Title III of 
the Wiretap Act so as “to protect against the unauthorized interception of electronic 
communications . . . [and] update and clarify Federal privacy protections and standards . . 
. .”
39
 This was mainly achieved under Title I, which addressed “the interception of wire, 
oral and electronic communications” (emphasis added).
40
 
Additionally, the drafting committee recognized that computers were being used 
as storage and information processing devices. To protect such data and usage, Title II 
was created to address “access to stored wire and electronic communications and 
transactional records.”
41
 Title II was based on the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978 
(“RFPA”),
42
 which was enacted to “protect the customers of financial institutions from 
unwarranted intrusion into their records . . . .”
43
 The RFPA was a “response to the 
Supreme Court decision in United States v. Miller which held that a customer of a 
financial institution has no standing under the [Fourth Amendment] to contest 
Government access to financial records.”
44
  Fearing that subscribers of electronic 
                                                 
37
 Id. 
38
 Pub. L. No. 99-508, 100 Stat. 1848 (1986). 
39
 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3555. 
40
 Id. at 3557. Despite this purpose, Congress failed to expressly mention video surveillance in Title I. 
Thus, as discussed below, it was ultimately the courts that ended up deciding upon a regulatory scheme. 
See, e.g., United States v. Torres, 751 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1984); United States v. Koyomejian, 946 F.2d 
1450 (9th Cir. 1991). 
41
 S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 3557. 
42
 Pub. L. No. 95-630, Title XI, 92 Stat. 3641, 3697 (1978). 
43
 H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 28 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 9305. 
44
 Id. at 9306 (citing United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976)). 
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communications services would also have no Fourth Amendment protections, Title II of 
the ECPA was passed in order control Government surveillance.
45
 
Similar to the RFPA before it, ECPA Title II was designed to strike a balance 
between protecting both “privacy interests” and “the Government’s legitimate law 
enforcement needs.”
46
 Thus, generally, Title II only permits the Government to acquire 
stored electronic communications either through the subscriber’s consent or through a 
judicial process, such as a search warrant, court order, or subpoena.
47
 However, a steadily 
expanding exception to this general rule was emerging: 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (“2709”). 
 Section 2709 was enacted as part of ECPA Title II. As originally enacted, it 
allowed the FBI to demand that communications firms, such as wire communication 
service providers and Internet Service Providers, hand over certain subscriber records, 
such as “subscriber information” and “electronic communication transactional records.”
48
 
The Government only had to certify that those records were “relevant to an authorized 
foreign counterintelligence investigation” and that there were “specific and articulable 
facts giving reason to believe that the person or entity to whom the information sought 
pertains is or may be a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power.”
49
  The demands 
made under § 2709 are in the form of national security letters (“NSL”), which are a 
“unique form of administrative subpoenas cloaked in secrecy and pertaining to national 
                                                 
45
 See S. REP. NO. 99-541, at 3 (1986), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3555, 3557-58. 
46
 Id. at 3557; see also H.R. REP. NO. 95-1383, at 28 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9273, 
9305. 
47
 18 U.S.C. § 2703 (2005). See also Freedman v. AOL, 303 F. Supp. 2d 121, 124 (Dist. Conn. 2004) 
(describing the steps the Government must take under § 2703 when seeking information from an ISP). 
48
 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (1988). 
49
 Id. There are a few other NSL statutes, each requiring compelled production of documents, certification 
of relevance to international terrorism or counterintelligence investigation, and perpetual non-disclosure. 
E.g., 12 U.S.C. § 3414 (financial records); 15 U.S.C. § 1681u (credit records); 50 U.S.C. § 436 
(government employee records). 
   
 10 
security issues.”
50
 Additionally, § 2709(c) permanently bars the NSL recipient from 
disclosing the inquiry. 
 In 1993, § 2709 was broadened by a weakening of the required connection to a 
foreign entity.  Previously, § 2709 required that the subscriber whose stored information 
was sought be a foreign power or agent.  This requirement was necessary so that NSLs 
would not be issued upon persons simply because they communicated with foreign 
entities.
51
 With this change, however, the statute required that the FBI simply show that 
“there are specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the person or entity 
to whom the information sought pertains is a foreign power or an agent of a foreign 
power as defined in section 101 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (50 
U.S.C. § 1801).”
52
 By referencing 50 U.S.C. § 1801, this amended provision was able to 
reach not just foreign individuals and entities, but also United States citizens, so long as 
there was a strong connection to a foreign entity.
53
 
 The final amendment to § 2709, which brought about the plaintiff’s claim in Doe 
v. Ashcroft, infra, came in October 2001 with the passing of the Patriot Act. Section 505 
of the act completely removed the long-standing requirement that there be a connection 
between the information sought under a § 2709 NSL and a foreign agent or power.  It was 
replaced by the mere standard of relevance: the FBI must certify that the “records sought 
are relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities . . . .”
54
 This change was made to streamline the 
acquisition of NSLs and thereby bring § 2709 into line with “existing criminal law where 
                                                 
50
 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
51
 H.R. REP. NO. 103-46, at 2 (1993), as reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1913, 1914. 
52
 18 U.S.C. § 2709 (1994). 
53
 50 U.S.C. § 1801(b) (2005). 
54
 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2005). 
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an Assistant United State Attorney may issue a grand jury subpoena for all such records 
in a criminal case.”
55
 Furthermore, this expanded statute still required permanent non-
disclosure from the NSL recipient and was silent on the need for prior judicial review.  
 While efficiency and prompt action are important to national security, it is 
important to acknowledge that grants of power “enabling [the government] to move in 
secrecy to a given end with the most expedient dispatch and versatile means . . . often 
pose the gravest perils to personal liberties.”
56
 Such concerns were voiced at the 
Congressional hearings surrounding the adoption of the Patriot Act.  One technology 
watchdog group stated that the section “would greatly increase access to the personal 
information of consumers or groups who are not agents of foreign powers” and that “the 
institutions granting access to consumer information would be prohibited from disclosing 
that information or records had been obtained.”
57
 These were the issues adjudicated in 
Doe v. Ashcroft.
58
 
 
IV. An Analysis of Doe v. Ashcroft: 
 The main plaintiff, “John Doe,” was an Internet access firm that received an NSL 
under § 2709.
59
 The other plaintiffs were the American Civil Liberties Union and the 
American Civil Liberties Union Foundation (collectively with Doe, “plaintiffs”).  Doe 
received an NSL stating that “pursuant to Title 18, United States Code (U.S.C.), Section 
                                                 
55
 H.R. REP. NO. 107-236, at 62 (2001). 
56
 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
57
 Protective Constitutional Freedoms in the Face of Terrorism: Hearing Before the Subcomm. On the 
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Senate Comm. On the Judiciary, 107th Cong., S Hrg. 
107-610, at 34 (2001) (Statement of Jerry Berman, Executive Director, Center for Democracy and 
Technology). 
58
 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). 
59
 As per the Government’s request, the District Court sealed the record of this proceeding in order to 
prevent the disclosure of Doe’s identity. Id. at 475 n.3. 
   
 12 
2709,” Doe was “directed” to provide information to the FBI.
60
 As per sections 
2709(b)(1) and (c), the NSL certified that the requested information was related to “an 
authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities,” and that Doe was prohibited from disclosing that the “[FBI] has 
sought or obtained access to information or records.”
61
 Doe did not hand over the 
requested information, but rather consulted with ACLU attorneys and brought suit. 
Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of § 2709 under the First and Fourth 
Amendments of the United States Constitution.
62
 Specifically, plaintiffs argued that § 
2709 gave “the FBI extraordinary and unchecked power to obtain private information 
without any form of judicial process, and, second, that § 2709’s non-disclosure provision 
burdens speech categorically and perpetually, without any case-by-case judicial 
consideration . . . .”
63
 Plaintiffs asked the Court to enjoin the Government from utilizing § 
2709 as a “means of gathering information from the sources specified in the statute.”
64
 
 After discussing the legislative history of § 2709, the Court compared NSLs with 
the Government’s other information-gathering techniques, such as administrative 
subpoenas, criminal context subpoenas, “mail cover”, and FISA.  Essentially, when 
dealing with a United States citizen, all of these other information-gathering techniques 
allow for some form of judicial review and at least limited, if not complete, disclosure. 
Even other ECPA Title II provisions, independent of the § 2709 NSL, require some level 
                                                 
60
 Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d. at 478. 
61
 Id. 
62
 The plaintiffs also argued that § 2709 violated the Fifth Amendment by failing to give notice. Because 
the Court found for the plaintiffs on other grounds, it declined to address this argument, thus I do not 
include it in my discussion. See Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d at 527 n. 268. 
63
 Id. at 475. 
64
 Id. at 476. 
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of judicial review and have limited non-disclosure periods.
65
 Based upon this general 
comparison, the Court stated that § 2709 NSLs seem to “provide fewer procedural 
protections to the recipient than any other information-gathering technique the 
Government employs to procure [similar] information.”
66
 
 The Court then sought to determine if § 2709, as drafted, raised any constitutional 
concerns.  It focused on two interpretive issues.
67
 First, § 2709, by its language, seemed 
to prohibit all disclosures, even to individuals “whose assistance is necessary to comply 
with the demands of the NSL,” such as an attorney.
68
 Second, § 2709 failed to explicitly 
state whether an NSL recipient could “affirmatively challenge, administratively or 
judicially, the propriety of an NSL request.”
69
 
The Government argued that the text of § 2709 already permitted an NSL 
recipient to both consult an attorney and challenge the NSL in court. The Court 
concluded, however, that even if it agreed with the Government’s argument, the 
“provisions and practices essentially force the reasonable NSL recipient to immediately 
comply with the request,” and that the “lack of effective process, at least as applied, 
entails issues far too fundamental for the Court to read as having been sufficiently 
addressed [by § 2709].”
70
 Thus, by comparing § 2709 to the Government’s other 
information-gathering techniques, as well as considering the statute’s own language, the 
Court, even before getting into the statute’s functionality under the instant facts, was 
making a case against the statute because of its lack of judicial review and disclosure. 
                                                 
65
 Id. at 487-89. 
66
 Id. at 484. 
67
 The Court also raised the issue that § 2709 failed to explicitly impose penalties against those who did not 
comply with an NSL request. Because this issue did not have a bearing on the motions before the Court, the 
Court did not address the issue further, nor do I. See Id. at 492. 
68
 Id. at 492. 
69
 Id. 
70
 Id. at 493. 
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 Turning to the heart of the matter, the Court analyzed the plaintiffs’ claim that § 
2709 violated the Fourth Amendment by giving the FBI practical power “to issue as well 
as enforce its own NSLs, instead of contemplating some form of judicial review.”
71
 
Essentially, § 2709 is silent about prior or subsequent NSL judicial review, and thus, as 
happened with Doe, the FBI can independently send a letter to an Internet access firm 
requesting the firm to relinquish subscriber records, which any reasonable recipient 
would do, especially in light of § 2709(a)’s use of the words “duty” and “shall comply.” 
Additionally, this unchecked power could, pursuant to the Patriot Act’s broad relevancy 
standard, permit the FBI to obtain the Internet records of not only a United States 
subscriber, but one with, potentially, a very tenuous link to 2709(b)’s requirement of 
relevancy “to an authorized investigation . . . against international terrorism or 
clandestine intelligence activities . . . .” 
As mentioned above, the Government argued that § 2709 should be interpreted to 
allow an NSL recipient to challenge the NSL in court. While the Court acknowledged 
that “where an alternative interpretation of [a] statute is fairly possible, courts are 
obligated to construe the statute to avoid . . . problems,”
72
 it nevertheless opted against 
this doctrine since the “anchoring of the Government’s theory in the legislative scheme 
[was] far from clear and convincing.”
73
 
The Court rejected the Government’s interpretation for three reasons, two of 
which are relevant to our concerns here.
74
 First, the Court noted that Congress actually 
                                                 
71
 Id. at 496. 
72
 Doe v. Ashcroft, 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 498 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (citing INS v. St. Cyr., 533 U.S. 289, 299-
300 (2001)). 
73
 Id. 
74
 The third reason for not giving effect to the Government’s reading is that doing so would raise separation 
of powers issues. Id. at 500 (Courts are not “legislative repair shops entrusted to perform Congress’s labors, 
and fix Congress’s purported errors or omission at the Government’s bidding.”). 
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included judicial review provisions in many of the other information-gathering statutes 
described above, and thus the government’s interpretation “is at odds with . . . 
comparable competing interpretations deriving from different statutes.”
75
 Second, and 
more importantly, the Court stated that the Government’s interpretation goes against a 
reasonable reading of Congress’s intent with § 2709: 
In light of the sensitivity and overarching national priority associated with the purposes 
of NSL statutes . . . as well as the gravity of the events [(i.e., 9/11)] that supplied the 
propelling force and context for the passage and recent amendments of § 2709 [via the 
Patriot Act § 505], one might fairly infer that the absence of any reference to judicial  
review is the product of Congressional intent.
76 
Additionally, the Court stated that “the statute could be read to signal Congress’s 
contemplation that less weight be given to protections of personal liberties in conflict 
with the acute national security interests § 2709 fosters” (emphasis added).
77
 
 In light of these statutory construction considerations, as well as the more 
practical realization that since the RFPA first permitted the Government to issue NSLs 
for financial records in 1978, no NSL recipient had ever challenged a request,
78
 the Court 
stated that “in practice NSLs are essentially unreviewable because . . . the recipient would 
consider himself . . . obliged to comply, with no other option but to immediately obey and 
stay quiet.”
79
 Thus, the Court ultimately concluded that § 2709 “ha[d] the effect of 
authorizing coercive searches effectively immune from any judicial process, in violation 
of the Fourth Amendment.”
80
 
 The Court then turned its attention to the plaintiffs’ First Amendment challenge of 
the § 2709(c) non-disclosure provision, which bars an NSL recipient, such as Doe (an 
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Internet access firm), from ever disclosing to anybody, including subscribers whose 
records were sought, that the FBI made such a request.  Plaintiffs argued that § 2709(c) 
was either a content-based speech restriction or a prior restraint on speech, either of 
which requires the court to analyze the provision under strict scrutiny analysis.
81
 The 
Government argued that the provision is only subject to intermediate scrutiny.
82
 
 The Court deemed § 2709(c) to be both a prior-restraint on speech and a content-
based restriction, thus requiring strict scrutiny analysis.  First, the provision functions as 
prior-restraint because it prevents speech before speech even occurs.  Second, the 
provision is a content-based restriction because it regulates an entire subject matter, and 
“[t]he First Amendment’s hostility to content-based regulation extends not only to 
restrictions on particular viewpoints, but also to prohibition of public discussion of an 
entire topic.”
83
 Here, the permanent non-disclosure provision prevents Doe from 
discussing with anybody, including the Internet subscriber, that Doe had received an NSL 
and had complied with the request. 
 The Court then stepped through the strict scrutiny analysis to determine if the § 
2709(c) speech restriction was valid.  The Court readily acknowledged the Government’s 
legitimate and compelling interest in “protecting the integrity and efficacy of 
international terrorism and counterintelligence investigations.”
84
 However, despite this 
compelling interest, the Court agreed with the plaintiffs that “§ 2709(c)’s categorical, 
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perpetual, and automatic ban on disclosure [was] not a narrowly-tailored means to 
advance those legitimate public interests.”
85
 
In fact, the Court even found FISA’s own non-disclosure provision, 50 U.S.C. § 
1861(d), to be less restrictive (i.e., more narrowly tailored) than § 2709(c).  First, the 
language of § 1861(d), while essentially a categorical bar, is nevertheless less restrictive 
because it expressly allows for disclosure to “persons necessary to produce” compliance 
with the subpoena.
86
 Second, FISA limits abuse by “requiring a clear connection to a 
foreign power and by sharply limiting the degree to which any United States citizen may 
be subject to surveillance under a secret FISA order.”
87
 Section 2709 completely lacks 
such protections for U.S. citizens, especially, as the Court pointed out, “after the 
significant broadening of the statute’s scope effectuated by the Patriot Act.”
88
 
The Government contended that, while § 2709(c) might not be as narrowly drawn 
as other information-gathering statutes, it is nevertheless consistent with First 
Amendment jurisprudence in that the Government may, in many cases, impose secrecy 
requirements when the secrecy is limited “to facts learned only by virtue of a given 
person’s participation in an [official] proceeding.
89
 In other words, when an NSL 
recipient “learns that an NSL has been issued only by virtue of his particular role in the 
underlying investigation, . . . the case law demonstrates [that] it presumptively does little 
violence to First Amendment values to condition the issuance of an NSL upon the 
recipient’s return obligation of at least some secrecy.”
90
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While the Court acknowledged the importance of this idea, it stated that the 
“doctrine reache[d] its limit . . . when the Court consider[ed] that the NSL statutes . . . 
impose a permanent bar on disclosure in every case, making no distinction among 
competing relative public policy values over time, and containing no provision for lifting 
that bar when the circumstances that justify it [are gone.]”
91
 Furthermore, the Court noted 
that “democracy abhors undue secrecy” and that “public knowledge secures freedom,” 
and as such, “unlimited government warrant to conceal . . . has no place in our open 
society” since it could “become the cover for spurious ends that government may then 
deem too inconvenient, inexpedient, merely embarrassing, or even illicit to ever expose 
to the light of day.”
92
  
 Because of these considerations, the Court ultimately concluded that “the statute 
simply does not allow for [a] balancing of competing public interests to be made by an 
independent tribunal at any point . . . [and thus,] it is conceivable that ‘less restrictive 
alternatives would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate purpose that the 
statute was enacted to serve.’”
93
 The Court, alluding to the case-by-case approach applied 
to other cases and information-gathering statutes, dismissed the Government’s emphasis 
on heightened secrecy in terrorism investigations by simply stating that “a case-by-case 
evaluation of the need for secrecy ‘does not mean that information helpful to terrorists 
will be disclosed, only that the Government must be more targeted and precise in its 
approach.’”
94
 Thus, because less restrictive alternatives were available, § 2709(c) was 
deemed to be in violation of the First Amendment. 
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 Finally, the Court addressed the question of whether § 2709(c) could be severed 
from the statute, thus saving sections (a) and (b).  The Court had to look to Congressional 
intent for the answer.  Upon doing so, it concluded that “Congress intended the statute to 
function as a secret means of gathering information from communications service 
providers,” and therefore, Congress “could not have intended §§ 2709(a) and (b) . . . to 
operate absent the non-disclosure provisions contained in § 2709(c).”
95
 
In its conclusion, the Court summarized its decision: “[T]he compulsory, secret, 
and unreviewable production of information required by the . . . application of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2709 violates the Fourth Amendment, and . . . the non-disclosure provision of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2709(c) violates the First Amendment.”
96
 The Government was “therefore enjoined 
from issuing NSLs under § 2709 or from enforcing the non-disclosure provision in this or 
any other case.”
97
 
 
V. Doe v. Ashcroft and the Judiciary’s Long-Standing Trend of Technological 
Judicial Review: 
The late Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote that “[i]n any civilized society the most 
important task is achieving a proper balance between freedom and order.”
98
 To him, it 
was the job of the courts to ultimately produce this balance.  And despite a historical 
judicial reluctance to decide against the Government on national security issues during 
war, he believed it was “both desirable and likely that more careful attention would be 
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paid by the courts [in the future] to the basis for the government’s claims of necessity as a 
basis for curtailing civil liberty.”
99
 
Some commentators question this proposition and say the courts, especially in our 
technologically advanced and post-9/11 world, “cannot be counted upon for robust 
defense of civil liberties . . . where claims of national security are invoked.”
100
 To them, 
the critical question is: “[T]o what extent [are the courts] ready to protect us against new 
forms of political surveillance made possible by advances in technology[?]”
101
 
To this author, the answer is simple: For the past four decades, the courts have 
already been consistently protecting us from new technologies and they will continue to 
do so in the future, perhaps even more strongly.  By simply requiring judicial review 
procedures with each new technological development, the courts have effectively 
shielded our civil liberties.  And even in our post-9/11 United States, while some call for 
legislative reform of online surveillance laws,
102
 the courts are already a step ahead by 
continuing to balance, via judicial review, Rehnquist’s goals of freedom and order, as is 
most recently demonstrated in the Doe v. Ashcroft decision. 
 The trend of requiring judicial review of technologically oriented curtailments of 
civil liberties began with Katz v. United States.
103
 In that case, the Government acquired 
incriminating evidence against Katz by placing, without a warrant, a listening and 
recording device to the outside of a public telephone booth.  While the Government 
argued that “surveillance of a telephone booth should be exempted from the usual 
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requirement of advance authorization by a magistrate,” the United States Supreme Court 
disagreed and held that prior judicial review was “a constitutional precondition of the 
kind of electronic surveillance involved in this case.”
104
 By so holding, the Court 
effectively incorporated the Fourth Amendment into the technological world.
105
 Katz, 
along with Berger v. New York,
106
 were such “watershed moment[s] for communications 
privacy” that Congress enacted the Wiretap Act in the following year to provide even 
more protection.
107
 
 This judicial trend received its next significant building block in 1972 with United 
States v. United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan.
108
 The 
question before the Court was whether the President could authorize electronic 
surveillance (i.e., wiretaps) without prior judicial approval for “internal security 
matters.”
109
 The United States Supreme Court once again focused on judicial review by 
stating that the “Fourth Amendment freedoms cannot properly be guaranteed if domestic 
security surveillances may be conducted solely within the discretion of the Executive 
Branch.”
110
 And even after giving deference to the constitutional basis of the President’s 
role in domestic security, the Court stated that this role “must be exercised in a manner 
compatible with the Fourth Amendment.  In this case we hold that this requires an 
appropriate prior warrant procedure.”
111
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 The trend of requiring judicial review of technologically oriented curtailments of 
civil liberties continued in the 1980s and early 1990s with a series of Circuit Court 
decisions involving video surveillance.  In United States v. Torres, the Seventh Circuit 
considered the novel issue of whether, and by what standards, the Federal Government 
could ever secretly videotape the interior of a private building and use that evidence in a 
criminal trial.
112
 The Court looked to the 1968 Wiretap Act for guidance, despite the 
Act’s failure to expressly authorize or regulate video surveillance.  Judge Posner, writing 
for the Court, stated that “we borrow the warrant procedure of Title III, a careful 
legislative attempt to solve a very similar problem, and hold that it provides the measure 
of the government’s constitutional obligations of particular description in using [video] 
surveillance to investigate crime.”
113
 Thus, by requiring judicial review for yet another 
advancement in technology, the courts had once again effectively protected our civil 
liberties. 
 Even after Congress passed the ECPA in 1986, with its conspicuous failure to 
mention video monitoring, various Circuit Courts continued to follow the reasoning in 
Torres and used the warrant guidelines in the Wiretap Act as the constitutional 
requirements for video surveillance.
114
 In fact, it was not until 1991 that a Circuit Court 
specifically used the ECPA warrant provisions for video surveillance.
115
 Regardless of 
whether the courts utilized the Wiretap Act or the ECPA, they were all applying the same 
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rationale: judicial review is required to protect the civil liberties of citizens subjected to 
video surveillance. 
The next case adding support to this trend of requiring judicial review of 
technologically oriented curtailments of civil liberties was decided just three months 
before the 9/11 terrorist attacks.  In Kyllo v. United States, the United States Supreme 
Court was asked to determine whether a thermal-imaging device aimed at a house so as 
to detect amounts of heat within it constituted a search.
116
 Writing for the Court, Justice 
Scalia noted that whatever “rule we adopt must take account of more sophisticated 
systems that are already in use or in development.”
117
 
The Court ultimately held that “[w]here, as here, the Government uses a device 
that is not in general public use, to explore details of the home that would previously 
have been unknowable without physical intrusion, the surveillance is a ‘search’ and is 
presumptively unreasonable without a warrant.”
118
 By accounting for technologies both 
in use and newly developed, and presuming that such technologies are presumptively 
unreasonable without a warrant, Justice Scalia had effectively stated what had been 
happening in the courts over the past four decades: citizens were being protected and not 
left “at the mercy of advancing technology.”
119
  
And now, even in our post-9/11 world of ongoing conflicts and potentially 
overreaching legislation, we are seeing this judicial trend continue.  In 2004 alone, there 
were three powerful opinions reinforcing the need for judicial review as a protection 
against the curtailment of valued civil liberties.  Two of these opinions are United States 
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Supreme Court cases dealing with physical detentions stemming directly from the 9/11 
terrorist attacks and subsequent armed conflicts.
120
 The third is the case at bar: Doe v. 
Ashcroft. 
 In the above analysis, we have seen the District Court for the Southern District of 
New York focus on § 2709’s complete lack of judicial process.  The Court held that the 
statute violated the Fourth Amendment because “it effectively bar[red] . . . any judicial 
challenge to the propriety of an NSL request.”
121
 . The Court further noted that the § 
2709(c) non-disclosure provision violated the First Amendment because it provided “no 
vehicle for the ban to ever be lifted from the recipient . . . under any circumstances, either 
by the FBI itself, or pursuant to judicial process.”
122
 
 The intense focus on judicial review is consistent with the trend started four 
decades ago by the Katz and Berger decisions.  This judicial trend, including Doe v. 
Ashcroft, has never held that the Government does not have a legitimate interest in using 
the latest technology to acquire information.  It has never disputed the Government’s 
claim that new technologies are often used as the vehicles for crime, and consequently 
must be occasionally monitored.  Furthermore, it has never dismissed the notion that, at 
times, compelling Government interests will require the abrogation of various civil 
liberties.  Rather, this judicial trend, including Doe v. Ashcroft, has simply required that 
the Government, when using old or new technology to abrogate civil liberties, explain its 
reasons for doing so.  It is that simple.  In this way, the judiciary has ensured that civil 
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liberties will advance in step with advances in technology and that a proper balancing of 
the late Chief Justice Rehnquist’s ideals of personal freedom and government order will 
occur. 
Doe v. Ashcroft is important to this judicial trend because it demonstrates that 
even after the unprecedented terrorist attacks of 9/11, the judiciary is still strongly 
committed to protecting civil liberties from advancements in technological surveillance.  
The decision is both comprehensive and well-reasoned, and thus provides a strong 
precedent for future courts to rely upon when dealing with new technologies.  It has made 
§ 505 of the Patriot Act useless, and has weakened the rationale for all NSL statutes, not 
just § 2709, by undercutting the Government’s purported need for complete secrecy.  
Because of these reasons, the addition of Doe v. Ashcroft to the long-standing trend 
requiring judicial review of technologically oriented curtailments of civil liberties is a 
substantial victory for privacy advocates everywhere. 
 
VI. Conclusion: 
 “[T]he law must advance with the technology to ensure the continued vitality of 
the [F]ourth [A]mendment.”
123
 This is what the “judicial trend” ensures.  By requiring, 
often before Congress has spoken, that Government surveillance involving technology is 
subject to judicial review, the courts are simultaneously protecting treasured civil liberties 
while also enabling legitimate law enforcement and national security measures to 
proceed. 
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Through Doe v. Ashcroft’s focus on judicial review, it can be seen that this trend 
continues in our post-9/11 world.  It not only moves the trend forward by adding another 
powerful precedent, but it also nullifies a section of the hastily enacted Patriot Act, 
weakens all NSL statutes, and specifically declares the § 2709 NSL authority permitting 
the Government to gain access to our online records unconstitutional. 
With all of this in mind, the millions of Americans who routinely use the Internet 
to conduct their everyday activities can breathe a sigh of relief and know that their 
electronic records are, and will be, safe from unchecked prying government eyes. 
